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Abstract
This article summarises the results of a media analysis conducted by the
example of  one of  the country’s biggest daily newspapers, the New Straits
Times. With regard to the controversial religious freedom debate, it
summarises what actors are involved in the discussion and how their
positions are presented in the mainstream media. Several examples from
articles show what strategies are employed in the discourse, such as the
rhetoric of fear and crisis and the constant emphasis of racial and other
supposedly separating categories. The close linkage of the categories ‘ethnicity’
and ‘religion’, which is manifested legally as well as politically, is perpetuated
linguistically. Especially important in this context is the construction of a
Muslim-Malay identity.
Keywords: religious freedom, media analysis, ethnicity, religion, muslim
identity
A. Introduction
Despite the surprising election results of 2008, Malaysia remains
a country with many obstacles to democratisation, irrespective of
whether one understands democracy minimally as an electoral process
or generally as people’s power and participation. One major hindrance
to consensus-building is the mindset brought about by a political system
that is based on the categories of race1 and religion. These two
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categories have at least since colonial rule played an important role in
determining the individual citizen’s identity. The government
perpetuates the colonial categorisation of the Malaysian citizenry into
official ethnic groups. Additionally to ethnic categorisation in birth
certificate, ID cards of citizens classified as Muslim carry the word
‘Islam’.
Malaysia, comprising a population of around 25 Million people,
officially counts about 60% Muslims, the biggest minorities stated to
be Buddhists and Christians.2 Despite the relatively small number of
citizens, Malaysia is present on the international stage and known as a
modern country with an impressive record of economic development.
Thus, it is often seen as a possible role model for other predominantly
Muslim states.  Furthermore, the diversity of  its citizenry is typical for
post-colonial societies. The debates related to the country’s
multireligiousity range from the discussion on who is entitled to use the
word ‘Allah’, to fights between families on the one side and the state
on the other over how a deceased person whose religious affiliation is
debated should be buried.
The significance of the religious categorisation has increased in
recent years. Unlike his or her non-Muslim counterpart, a citizen born
to parents who are categorised as Muslim will fall under shari>‘ah law
when it comes to matters related to marriage, inheritance and personal
morality. One can argue that equality before the law, an important
factor of  democracy, is not given. Additionally, observers testify growing
communitarianism along religious lines. At the same time, the dominant
component of the governing coalition, United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO), and their main rival for votes of those classified
as Malays, the Islamist opposition party Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS),
compete in establishing their own respective version or brand of Islam.
This ‘holier-than-thou-race’ has lead to an overall more conservative
–––––––––––––––––
1 I explicitly distance myself from the categories of race and ethnicity in any
other form than the discursive. Both the category of race and the category of ethnicity
have no other valid foundation than their discursive construction. They are thus used
only in this regard in this paper.
2 Department of Statistics Malaysia, Population Distribution and Basis Demographic
Characteristics Report - Population and Housing Census 2000 (Putrajaya, 2001).
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009 M/1430 H 113
Racialising Religion in the Debate of Religious Freedom in Malaysia
character of the public discussion on Islam.
The religious identity marker has become so intertwined with
the racial one that the two are often used synonymously and it could
be argued that the religious marker is slowly replacing the ethnical.
The following paper shows by means of a discourse analysis of the
New Straits Times, one of  the nation’s leading English language
newspapers how the categories of race/ethnicity and religion are
interlinked and the old barriers linguistically perpetuated in daily media
coverage.
1. Malaysia’s Political System
Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy. The prime minister is the
head of government within a multi-party system. Executive power is
with the government, while federal legislative power lies with both the
government and the two parliamentary chambers.
Although one finds the typical institutions of a liberal democracy
based on the British system, most scholars of political studies agree in
calling Malaysia a semi-democracy or a (semi-) autocratic system.
Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way identify
‘competitive authoritarianism’ as “one particular type of ‘hybrid’
regime” and classify Malaysia as such.3
While the elections themselves are mainly free, they cannot be
considered fair.4 They are only to a certain extent competitive and the
oppositional parties are starkly disadvantaged. The constituencies are
designed in UMNO’s favour and various political freedoms, like
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right to demonstrate,
are restricted. Since the formation of  Malaysia in 1963, politics have
been dominated by UMNO. The party constitutes the major component
of  the ruling Barisan National (BN; National Front) coalition which
also includes the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).
–––––––––––––––––
3 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of  Competetive
Authoritarianism”, Journal of  Democracy, 13 (2002), p. 52.
4 see for instance Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (St Leonards,
New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1996) p. 75.
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2. Malaysia’s Media
Although freedom of speech and press freedom are enshrined in
Article 10 of the constitution, Malaysian media face restrictions on
several levels. Most TV and radio channels are indirectly state-owned
or –controlled, as is a large percentage of the print media. The media
additionally face restrictions through the obligation of annually getting
their publishing licence renewed.  While the importance of the media
as an arena of democratic contestation is undisputed for Malaysia, the
emergence of widespread independent journalism is still in its beginning
and relies very much on online sources.
While the internet press is of increasing importance and critical
coverage is believed to have played an important role in leading to
UMNO’s severe loss in the 2008 elections,5 the printing press does
react to this development. Newspapers like the English language New
Straits Times and The Star begin to give space to critical voices and
often react to precedent reports by alternative media.
Accessing it on the level of English language mainstream media
sheds light on ‘UMNO-speak’ and thus on the institutional power that
has exercised social engineering since the existence of Malaysia.
Keeping in mind Foucault’s notion of  power, we emanate from the
idea that this power is to a large extent realised through language and
discourse.
3. The Linkage of Race/Ethnicity and Religion
As aforementioned, the government has continued the colonial
categorisation of the population into four groups:  Bumiputera (mainly
Malays),6 Chinese, Indians and Others. Malays/Bumiputera have been
secured a special position in the constitution (Article 153(2) and have
been granted numerous privileges since the introduction of the
–––––––––––––––––
5 see Hang Wu Tang, “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom: Digital Speech in
Malaysia”, Asian Journal of  Comparative Law, 1(2007); Andreas Ufen, “Politischer
Neubeginn in Malaysia: Die Parlamentswahlen vom März 2008”, GIGA-Focus, 4 (2008),
p. 4.
6 Bumiputera means literally ‘sons/children of the soil’ and includes Malays as
well as other ‘native ethnic groups’ in Sabah and Sarawak. The definition has grown to
incorporate smaller minorities, yet it largely comprises those identified as Malay.
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affirmative action program New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, as
for instance easier access to education and loans. Although the NEP
was officially terminated in 1991, many privileges remain in existence
until today. The Malay/Bumiputera group is presented and perceived as
more homogeneous than the others, not least due to the consequent
identity engineering by the government, of which the linkage of
ethnicity and religion is one manoeuvre.
The linkage of religion and ethnicity is not only perpetuated on
a textual level, but also legally. A Malay is constitutionally defined as
someone who speaks the Malay language, practices Malay customs
and professes the religion of Islam (Art.160). The applicability of
Syariah is therefore directly linked to being categorised as Malay.
A conversion to Islam from another religion was traditionally
understood and described as ‘masuk Melayu’ or becoming Malay or
entering Malayness.7 A Chinese convert to Islam faces the difficulty of
not being fully accepted as a Muslim by fellow Muslims who are
predominantly Malay.8 This ‘knot’ of  ethnicity and religion in this
institutionalised form is a special characteristic of  the Malaysian case.
Notwithstanding the difference between the two, the connection
between Islam and Malay identity is of growing importance, as the
initially race-based politics are increasingly religion-based.9 It is for
instance striking that in the media, Islam is not nearly as often discussed
in religious contexts as in political.10  The shift from emphasis of
ethnicity to that of religion especially becomes evident in the
differentiation between Muslims and non-Muslims.
–––––––––––––––––
7 Judith Nagata, The Chinese Muslims of Malaysia: New Malays or New Associates?
A Problem of  Religion and Ethnicity: The Past in Southeast Asia’s Present, Ottawa: Canadian
Council for Southeast Asian Studies, 1978), p. 108.
8 Joy Y. Lam, Religious Conversion and Reconstruction of  Identities: The Case of
Chinese Muslim Converts in Malaysia, Hong Kong: Southeast Asia Research Centre, City
University of  Hong Kong, 2004), p. 6.
9 Farish A. Noor, “Race and Islam”, Daily Times, Lahore, 2008.
10 This hypothesis was verified during a quantitative discourse analysis in a
seminar held by Eva Streifeneder and Frederik Holst at Humboldt University in 2006/
2007.
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4. Discourse Analysis: Material and Processing
For the purposes of  this paper, the electronic archives of  the
New Straits Times from 2001 until July 2007 were scanned. The date
for the beginning of  the analysis is based on Mahathir’s significant
declaration in October 2001 that Malaysia is an Islamic state. The
analysed time frame ends with Najib’s confirmation of  the declaration
and herewith follows Clive Kessler’s interpretation of  an accomplished
change of  UMNO to a party that offer no alternative to PAS, as
explained above.11
Several key words were used and after a first scan of all titles
and headlines the most relevant articles were chosen.12
Those articles filtered out mainly regard foreign affairs. Although
these are of course indirectly related to the portrayal of the national
situation, they are not as interesting as the articles from the section on
national politics. Some significant reports about foreign issues have
remained in the pool.
The key words used were “religious freedom”, “apostasy”, “Article
11”, “Islamic State” and the names of individuals involved in high
profile cases regarding religious freedom, such as “Lina Joy”, “Shamala”,
“Moorthy”, “Wong Ah Kiu”, “Revathi”.  These keywords cover the
large majority of, if not all articles related to the topic of religious
freedom.
They altogether brought about around 600 articles of which all
headlines and most first paragraphs were read to filter about 120 relevant
articles. The articles identified as significant were read and structurally13
analysed in full.
–––––––––––––––––
11 Clive S. Kessler, Islam, the State & Desecularisation: The Islamist Trajectory During
the Badawi Years: Sharing the Nation (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research
Development Centre, 2008).
12 It is an admitted methodological weakness of  Jäger’s procedure that the
criteria for this selection are not entirely clear. After an overview scanning and rough
analyses, the researcher chooses representative articles according to his or her evaluation;
see Siegfried Jäger (ed.), Wie kritisch ist die Kritische Diskursanalyse? (Münster: Unrast-
Verlag, 2008), p. 28.
13 The term “structural analysis” describes a rough analysis, including collective
symbols, content and the like. See Ibid., p. 172, footnote 178.
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C. Actors and Strategies in the Debate on Religious Freedom
For a more detailed understanding of  the discursive setting, it is
useful to look at political scientist Claudia Derichs’ analysis of popular
Islamic discourse,14 where she identifies five groups of actors as
examples and representatives of  the plurality of  Malaysia’s discourse
setting. She names (1) the leaders and members of  PAS and the
conservative Muslim organisation Persatuan Ulama Malaysia, (2) the
liberal women’s rights organisation Sisters in Islam, (3) Islamic NGOs
and movements like ABIM, (4) Islamist/extremist NGOs and
movements, and finally (5) the “government camp”.15
Derichs borrows a typology of  discourse strategies where she
categorises discourse strategies into five clusters of characteristics:16
1) The preserving strategy is status quo-oriented and frequently
utilised by the existing powers.
2) The rectifying strategy is status quo-oriented, but in a more
defensive manner, often trying to rescue a damaged reputation.
3) The constructive strategy, change-oriented and reform-seeking,
goes beyond criticisms of  the status quo and suggests concepts
and ideas. An example is the above mentioned monogamy campaign
by SIS. Rather than voicing transformatory demands (see 4), the
campaign aimed at raising awareness of existing rights and
possibilities among Muslim women.
4) The change-oriented transformation attempts are often hard to
distinguish from the constructive argumentation. Generally, they
are stronger than the former and are often sought by victims of
certain circumstances and conditions. For instance, questioning
the codified Malay rights would be such a transformatory demand,
usually met with severe consequences for those who dare to speak
it out. Thus, Derichs points out, this strategy seldom succeeds
under authoritarian systems.
–––––––––––––––––
14 Claudia Derichs, “Form Follows Function? Popular Islamic Discourse in
Malaysia”, in M. B. Mathias Hildebrandt (ed.), Unfriedliche Religionen (Wiesbaden: VS
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), pp. 122-128.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 127.
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5) The most radical strategy, the destructive one, is almost never
employed by critics of the government, but sometimes by the
government itself. Derichs refers to the intended destruction of
Anwar Ibrahim’s reputation by questioning his Islamic credentials
through the accusations of sodomy and also cites the discussion
in 2003 on closing all religious schools because the teachers were
allegedly PAS-leaning.
Since this analysis focuses on the New Straits Times and thus on
the UMNO-dominated discourse, most of the results can be sorted
under Derichs’ first two status quo-oriented strategic categories, namely
the preserving and the rectifying strategy. It has to be kept in mind
that all discourse strings and levels are interconnected and thus certain
strategies, especially those employed by the government, are reactions
to others, e.g. to criticisms from the opposition.
During this analysis, twelve discursive strategies17 were identified.
Such strategies include the frequent use of racial categories, their
linkage to the category of religion, the rhetoric of crisis and fear as
well as the repetitive reminding of the riots in 1969. The rhetoric of
division is continued in the calling for interfaith dialogue which is not
supported by institutional changes, as shown by means of the example
of  the article on Najib’s appeal to hold more interfaith dialogues.
Rhetoric of division is in addition to the internal division used to
perpetuate the old divide between Asia and ‘the West’. Some headlines
are strongly judgemental and strengthen doubts about the already
questionable objectivity of the coverage.
It is remarkable how often political leaders and reporters refer to
the constitution. Furthermore, certain subjects are monopolised and
some groups are asked not to comment on them, while the political
decision makers claim openness and directness regarding sensitive issues
for them. The language used in the analysed articles perpetuates the
idea of  ‘once a Muslim, always a Muslim’. Finally, it becomes evident
that those who influence the newspaper aim at monopolising the right
to interpretation of Islam.
–––––––––––––––––
17 Ibid., pp. 128-130.
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The most important strategy is the constant perpetuation of
division and the threat of further division that could in the worst case
escalate into violence. There are several dimensions to this threat, the
most significant being the division within the Malaysian society along
so-called racial or ethnic lines on one side and, often synonymously
used, religious lines on the other side.
The racial division is perpetuated in many aspects of daily life
and daily language as well as being a continuous theme in the media.
The frequent use of racial categories is increasingly complemented by
the synonymous use of  religious categorisation. Very often, “race and
religion” and the formulation “multi-racial and multi-religious” are
mentioned together as if an inseparable tandem and raise the impression
that the lines run congruently.
“They (Christmas carols, SLS) are certainly not out of place in an Open
House, which Rais correctly describes as ‘a joyous occasion where
people of all races and religions can get together and partake of the
celebration.”18
This formulation unnecessarily includes the word ‘race’ and
thereby suggests that there are ‘racial’ festivities, or that festivities are
likely to be celebrated only with people of your own ‘race’. The religious
festivals of course claim universality and as a matter of course are
neither race-bound nor bound to any other political or social community
other than the religious.
Several other examples show this synonymous use:
“The Prime Minister said religious tolerance among the various races
was vital in preserving the country’s peace and harmony”.19
Here, rather than saying ‘among the various religious
communities’, the word ‘race’ is utilised to suggest the congruence
already mentioned.
–––––––––––––––––
18 The term strategies is used because “(…) contributions to a public discourse
do not appear without a certain idea, concept or objective in the mind of the contributors.
In most cases, discourse actors would like to see their argument become accepted by a
broader audience or even generate some change within the thinking of other influential
actors. The intention of  a discourse actor lies in the provocation of  thought”; Ibid., p.
121.
19 Joyous Sounds of Christmas, 21.12.2004.
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Another pattern repeatedly observed is the preceding mentioning
of ‘non-Muslims’ and then referring to the Chinese:
“He said Pas‘ stand on the matter was also causing fear among non-
Muslim communities. Ong said the MCA and Chinese (emphasis mine, SLS)
accepted and respected Islam as the official religion, but, this was not
applicable to Pas’ plans.”20
“Malaysian Chinese have been assured that they will not lose their rights
and privileges despite the recent statement by Prime Minister Datuk
Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad that the country is an Islamic state.”21
Another similar example:
“Non-Muslim parties in the country today welcomed Prime Minister
Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s assurance yesterday that
Islamisation will not hurt non-Muslims. MCA Youth secretary-general
Liow Tiong Lai (emphasis mine, SLS) said non-Muslims should regard
Islam ‘holistically’ as a dynamic and progressive religion that would
take the country forward.”22
“[DAP leaders] felt they suffered as a consequence of  Pas’ insistence
on its brand of an Islamic state for Malaysia, which pushed Chinese
(emphasis mine, SLS) voters towards MCA and Gerakan.”23
In all cases, an antagonism between Islam (and thus Muslims)
and Chinese is built, despite the fact that Islam as a universal religion
is as a matter of course not bound by ‘race’ and despite the existence
of large Muslim communities in China and that of Muslim Malaysians
of Chinese origin, including converts as well as members of families
who have for hundreds of years been Muslim.
The same pattern is used to identify Malays with Muslims:
“The survey, conducted in late December, also indicates that while non-
Muslims are generally comfortable with the level of Islamisation in
Malaysia, the Malays (emphasis mine, SLS) want more”.24
–––––––––––––––––
20 PM: Religious Tolerance is vital, 14.05.2001.
21 MCA against PAS’ Islamic state plan, 16.07.2001.
22 Ling: Our rights are assured, 21.10.2001.
23 Non-Muslim parties hail PM’s assurance, 25.02.2004.
24 See more results for PKR playing both ends against the middle, 23.06.2007.
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“Q: What about certain ongoing issues which are race-sensitive?
A: (For instance) when one wants to leave Islam, it raises a lot of
questions. This is a new experience to us.”25
“(…) 500 people who gathered to disrupt the Article 11 forum here
last year shouted Islamic slogans which caused anxiety to other races.”26
This connection of race and religion is not only obvious in the
cited examples, but also in an article on the Lina Joy judgement: “On
April 23, 2001, the court dismissed her application on the grounds
that the issue should be decided by the syariah court. It also held that
as a Malay and a Muslim, she could not convert.”27 The racial and
religious categories are completely self-evidently used together,
demonstrating their indivisibility in state-centred Malaysian
understanding.
Besides the constant language of separation, the rhetoric of crisis
and fear is important. The government portrays itself  as the preserver
of peace and stability without which not only the different ‘ethnic’
groups would attack each other, but without which especially those
classified as Malay would lose their position.
Examples:
Headline: “CM: ‘Pas’ aim to set up Islamic state will divide the country”.28
“’PM: Religious tolerance vital’: “The Prime Minister said religious tolerance
among the various races (emphasis mine, SLS) was vital in preserving
the country’s peace and harmony. The world, he said, had seen how
religious intolerance could cause infighting and chaos among followers
of  different faiths or denominations. (…) Malaysians should be grateful
that they could lead such harmonious and peaceful lives despite living
in a multi-religious society. Unlike some other countries, he said, there
was freedom to practise one’s own religion in this country. ‘We see
places of  worship everywhere in this country. It will be very difficult
to quell tense situations once there is (emphases mine, SLS) distrust and
–––––––––––––––––
25 Malays trust ulama to tell the truth more than anyone else, 29.02.2004.
26 Behind closed doors, sometimes, 13.05.2007.
27 Protesters caused anxiety to other races, 07.08.2007.
28 Lina must go to syariah court, 31.05.2007.
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disrespect among one another as a result of religious intolerance”.29
Here, the usage of future and present tense rather than the
adequate subjunctive suggests the proximity of  danger.
The constant reminder of the riots in May 1969 is employed in
the following interview too:
“RACIAL (sic) unity in the country has come a long way since May 13,
1969. Though the foundations are strong, more can be done to
strengthen it. PATRICK SENNYAH (sic) speaks to Datuk Dr Maximus
Ongkili, the Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department in charge of
national unity, on the issue.
Q: How would you describe racial unity now?
A: I have been in this job for the last three years. (…) In fact, the
relationship among the Malays, Chinese and Indians has never been
better. People are more conscious now and aware of  the importance
of racial tolerance. Nobody wants a repeat of May 13.”
The fact that a minister is in charge of national unity is noticeable.
Furthermore, the word ‘race’ appears three times in these nine lines,
complemented by the usual categories. The usual Sword of  Damocles,
the riots of  13 May 1969, is used to demonstrate the government’s
success in cooling down the tensions since. The government’s role,
here represented by the interviewed Minister, is emphasised by
highlighting the five visits of the Minister in Kampung Medan, a district
in Kuala Lumpur that saw violent outbreaks in 2001.
Further:
“I believe in Malaysia, unity strongly exists. What we need to work on
is the integration part. Overall, the situation is fine. The police don’t get
many race-based complaints, just about 300 per year.
Q: Could you elaborate on these race-based complaints?
A: Sometimes it is over a woman, like the last such complaint in Cheras
two months ago.30
–––––––––––––––––
29 18.02.2001.
30 14.05.2001.
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The topic of ‘race’ is very much in the foreground. In what way
a dispute over personal affairs can count as a ‘race-based complaint’
remains unclear.
Another vital tactic is the calling for interfaith dialogue while at
the same time not supporting it organisationally. It can also be argued
that the call for dialogue as such is already divisive, because it
perpetuates the impression of divided groups, which may not be as
divided as rhetorically portrayed.31
Example:  The article titled “Najib: Hold more Interfaith
Dialogues” reads:
“Interfaith and inter-culture dialogues should be encouraged so that
the people are familiar with and appreciate universal values, said Deputy
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak. He said tension between the
Christian and Muslim civilisations could be eased if there were more
such dialogues”.32
In this example, the dichotomy between Muslim and Christian
‘civilisations’ is employed.
Another example:
“Because inter-religious distrust and suspicion can so easily exacerbate
communal feelings, it is incumbent upon Muslim and non-Muslim
communities to harness their moral and intellectual energies to create
an atmosphere that is more conducive to inter-religious understanding
and harmony”.33
Interestingly, this comment is written by Chandra Muzaffar, a
well known public intellectual in Malaysia who is a human rights activist
and very involved in several liberal civil society organisations.
Other lines of division regard not the internal division, but the
global rhetoric of a division between ‘orient’ and ‘occident’ or between
Malaysia and its neighbours.
“Today, the concept of  democracy is still being contested and
negotiated by a number of different social actors and marginalised
–––––––––––––––––
31 Behind closed doors, sometimes, 13.05.2007.
32 see Olivier Olivier Roy, “Le découplage de la religion et de la culture: une
exception musulmane?”, Esprit, 333 (2007), p. 242.
33 Najib: Hold more Interfaith Dialogues, 27.12.2004.
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groupings in the West. This is why even religious minorities, like Muslim
migrants in the West, continue to speak the language of  democracy
when pushing for their collective rights”.34
An Interview with the already mentioned Datuk Dr Maximus
Ongkili, minister in charge of national unity:
“Worse, there is a high concentration of  illegal immigrants living in
these areas. Many of  these illegals look like Malaysians and sometimes
when they misbehave, we think it is actually the work of one of our
own people.”
Despite Mahathir’s image as an outspoken critic of  ‘the West’,
the internal division is much more important within Malaysian politics.
The discourse on migration is heavily loaded with prejudices and
judgements in Malaysian media, and the distinction from the
neighbouring countries is one instrument to boost national identity.
At the same time, through this tactic the Malaysian Malays are
distinguished from Indonesian and Philippine Malays. This helps those
in power to screen them off from the influence of their neighbours
who sometimes share the Malay language and traditions, but are
Christians.
Also noticeable is the strongly judgemental character of some
headlines, such as in this article:
“Indefensible behaviour” (08.06.2005) as headline for an article
describing how “no syariah (sic!) lawyer in Terengganu is apparently
prepared to defend the 45 people being charged in the Syariah High
Court for not complying with a State fatwa which declared the teachings
of Ariffin Mohammad, aka Ayah Pin, to be deviant.”
Interesting is also the frequent reference to the constitution. While
liberal NGOs and intellectuals refer to the constitution to criticise the
government, members of the government often refer to it as well and
naturally find higher reportage of their version and interpretation in
the mainstream media:
“The MCA is against any attempt by Pas to set up an Islamic State if it
comes to power, party vice-president Datuk Seri Ong Ka Ting said
today. He said the country’s constitution, which allows freedom of
–––––––––––––––––
34 Tackling inter-religious issues (comment), 31.12.2005.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009 M/1430 H 125
Racialising Religion in the Debate of Religious Freedom in Malaysia
worship for all Malaysians, would be compromised and threatened
should Pas rule the country.”35
“Nothing is going to change because the Federal Constitution will not
be amended. We can continue to practise other religions in peace as
guaranteed by the Constitution”.36
“Religious freedom a way of  life: ‘Although Islam is recognised as the
official religion in the Constitution, the liberty to practise other religions
is constitutionally guaranteed as well’.37
This latter formulation implies that the official character of  Islam
was the constitution’s main point and the religious freedom an
appendage, while most sources make it clear that it was intended the
other way round.
Another way of monopolising the sovereignty of interpretation
for controversial matters is the request for certain groups not to engage
with the respective subjects.
Example: “Bar Council told not to interfere in Islamic laws”.38
The government, through its media influence, claims openness
about sensitive issues for itself:
“Some of the most contentious topics in Malaysia were discussed when
51 members of the National Unity Advisory Panel met today”.39
With such a statement, the government re-emphasises its role as
an indispensable moderator in an immature environment. The usage
of the phrase ‘sensitive issues’ in the headline also perpetuates the
exact sensitivity of  these topics.
Regarding the coverage of the conversion cases, it is interesting
how language reflects the very idea of being born a Muslim and staying
one:
“Joy, who claims she has converted to Christianity, is seeking to have
the word ‘Islam’ deleted from her identity card”.40
–––––––––––––––––
35 Give democracy a chance to prove itself, 03.03.2001.
36 MCA against PAS’ Islamic state plan, 16.07.2001.
37 DPM: Umno-Pas talks unnecessary, 10.07.2001.
38 Religious freedom a way of life, 22.12.2003.
39 Headline 01.03.2002.
40 Frank discussions on sensitive issues; Denial of right an injustice, 29.06.2006.
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While Lina Joy has been stating for many years now that she is
not a Muslim, the newspaper still refers to her as such. Her conversion
is occasionally portrayed as suspicious, as demonstrated here.
Due to efforts to monopolise the interpretation of Islam,
formulations like the following example are frequent. The question is
extracted from an interview with Mufti Dr Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin:
“Why is there a difficult relationship between Muslims and non-
Muslims? Is it because Islam has been misunderstood by others?”42
This suggestive question not only emanates from a ‘difficult
relationship’ in a biased way, but it also proposes that there are
understandings of  Islam that are right and wrong. Always underlying
any discussion regarding Islam is the competition between PAS and
UMNO, thus it can be assumed that this questioning claims the right
understanding for UMNO.
Important is also the way in which the blockages of  the forums
organised by the Article 11 coalition in 2006 were portrayed. Although
a condemning comment of a government representative is mentioned
in it, the following sampled interview with one of  the protestors carries
a suggestive judgemental title, ‘We feel they have a hidden agenda’,
and gives a remarkable amount of  space to a very conservative view
on the discussion. The reproduction of  large parts of  the interview is
due to its pertinence for illustrating common lines of  argumentations.
“(…) Mohd Azmi Abdul Hamid, one of those behind the protest,
feels the civil society group has a hidden agenda.
He feels the Muslim community cannot accept any kind of pressure
by Article 11 on the Government, especially if it involves a challenge
to Islamic law. (…)
Q: Why did Badai demonstrate against the forum?
A: This forum is being seen by Muslims as a challenge to Syariah. They
want to liberalise it in a way that conforms to Western values.
We cannot allow this. (…)
Q: Why has your movement not raised its views at the forums?
–––––––––––––––––
42 Pas Youth following keenly, 04.07.2006.
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A: (…)  Muslims cannot accept any kind of pressure that this forum is
placing on the Government. (…)
Q: But Muslims were among panelists at the forum?
A: Unfortunately, other Muslims do not see them as representative of
the community. They have their own secular, liberal, understanding of
Islam. They want Syariah to be placed along with universal values and
are in favour of a secular society in a secular state.
Because they are not representing the Muslim community, they are
actually representing a secular minority group. We feel that what they
stand for is their own perception of Islam.
They want Islam to be just a private matter and that Syariah law should
only be used in handling private matters. They do not represent the
community or what Islam stands for in this country. (…)
‘We feel they have a hidden agenda‘.43
It is remarkable how in this interview, the representative of  Badai
claims to speak for the whole Muslim community. This claim,
constituting a major thread throughout the text, is supported by the
summarising paragraph in the beginning of the article, where the author
speaks about “the Muslim community” and thus does not question the
interviewee’s representative ambitions.
Besides exclusive formulations, the interviewee explicitly states
that “other Muslims do not see them (the Muslim panellists at the
forum, SLS) as representative of  the community”. Furthermore:
“Because they are not representing the Muslim community, they are
actually representing a secular minority group” and “They do not
represent the community or what Islam stands for in this country”.
These formulations create a dichotomy between secularists and
Muslims that remain unchallenged by the interviewer. Additionally,
the Badai-representative’s answers suggest a certain brand of  Malaysian
Islam and touches upon the old accusation of  infiltration of  ‘Western
values’.
–––––––––––––––––
43 Countering the scary view of Islam, 10.12.2006
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The fact that this interview is given so much space and, despite
some contrary opinions, remains large unchallenged in the overall
coverage, suggests that this attitude may not be too far from what the
government’s own position.
D. Conclusion
The examples have illustrated different discursive strategies,
differing in frequency and importance. A major strategy is the obvious
perpetuation of  the linkage of  religion and ethnicity.
The identified discursive strategies, consciously or unconsciously
employed, can be categorised according to their respective functions.
One major function of the rhetoric of division is the old principle of
divide and rule. Just as the colonial masters had divided their colonial
subjects, often along racial criteria, the Malaysian power elite continued
this scheme not only in the administrative procedures, but also in the
daily language.
Part of this rhetoric of division is the frequent use of racial
categories, especially in contexts where a person’s race does not matter,
for instance in the text sample regarding the religious festivities.
Striking is the linguistic dimension of the shift of the division
line from Malays vs. non-Malays to Muslims vs. non-Muslims. This
shift is evident in the equation of Malays and Muslims, for instance by
contrasting the latter category to those classified as Chinese.
Part of the divisive speech is also the rhetoric of crisis and fear,
including the frequent reminders of the riots in 1969, which are without
exception portrayed as ‘racial riots’. These reminders are not only subtly
integrated into the usual coverage, but the sampled interview shows
the explicit addressing of  the issue on the 13 May. This framing further
stresses the importance of  the date, which is part of  the nation’s
collective memory anyways.
The divisive rhetoric is supported by calls for interfaith dialogue
in the NST, as in the comment by Chandra Muzaffar. The very idea of
dialogue is based on the idea that there are different camps.44
–––––––––––––––––
44 NST 21.05.2006.
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In the example of the comment by Chandra Muzaffar, the
rhetoric of division are not only employed by representatives of the
government or political extremists. He speaks of  ‘Muslim and non-
Muslim communities’, linguistically fuelling the tense atmosphere of
increasing communitarianism along religious lines. This formulation is
similar to the comparison of  building bridges between cultures: For
the necessity of a bridge, there has to be a gap in the first place, which
is confirmed and perpetuated by calls for bridges or dialogues.
This is of course not only valid for the ever cited example of
‘Islam and the West’, but also for any similar context, in this case the
illustrated inner-Malaysian discussion.
Whether Chandra Muzaffar used this formulation consciously
for lack of space of an alternative phrasing or whether he used it
unconsciously and out of good intentions remains unclear, but this is
not so important for the analysis as the fact that not only those
spokespersons close to the government utilise such divisive rhetoric,
but also those who are usually seen as liberals.
This shows how effective the rhetoric is and how important it is
to read the lines, and in between the lines, closely.
Additionally, the supporters of  the government frequently refer
to the constitution and thereby seek to legitimate their actions. The
claim of openness regarding so-called sensitive issues, as in the reported
meeting of the National Unity Advisory Panel, is interesting as it
contrasts with the factual restrictions on free speech and the detentions
of  journalists described earlier.
Finally, another major feature is the shift from the racial to the
religious divide, which goes further than divide and rule, namely
supporting UMNO’s monopolisation of  Islam. Not only portraying
UMNO as the sole protectors of the nation, the shift from the stressing
of Malayness to that of Islam or Muslimness brings about the fight for
the sole right interpretation of Islam. By publishing calls of Muslim
extremists for non-Muslims to stay out of the discussion on one hand,
and by portraying PAS’ approach as wrong on the other, the sole right
for the interpretation of Islam is claimed for the group of ‘non-extremist
Muslims’ that UMNO claims to represent.
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Given the editorial power of those close to the government, it is
likely to assume that the featured interview with the Badai-
representative does reflect UMNO’s stance to a certain extent. The
argumentation line employed in this interview seems to fit into Derichs’
fifth category, that of  destructive strategies. The interviewee clearly
tries to deprive the panellists of  the forums in particular and secular
Muslims in general, of  their credibility to speak for Islam or as Muslims.
The discourse perspective on the debate has demonstrated the
multiple facets of the debate on religious topics in Malaysia. The
positions in debates vary to a large extent and the lines run neither so
much between Muslims and non-Muslims, nor between the government
and the opposition, but between secularists, or liberals, and
conservatives.
To gain a full picture of  the linguistic dimension of
communitarianism, it would be necessary to analyse alternative media
and the texts of NGOs, especially those of liberal background. Even
without having done a similarly thorough analysis, it can be said that
the equation of race and religion is widespread in Malaysian discourse.
Similar examples to those shown here in detail can be found in the
online newspaper Malaysiakini. Surprisingly, although to a lesser extent,
this is also true for the discourse of  liberal NGOs, who occasionally
slip into similar formulations.
This shows that an analysis of the NST not only reveals the
strategies of parts of the government or those close to them, but in
fact suggests a general tendency in Malaysian discourse.
As mentioned in the introduction, scholars of democracy studies
expect a well educated middle class to challenge any autocratic regime
and are surprised to find the transformation process – or
democratisation– in Malaysia to remain in stalemate. Malaysia’s
economic success is remarkable and following the modernisation
theorists’ assumptions, one would expect the educated middle class to
support and accelerate democratisation. Instead, the Malaysian middle
class is divided and movements like ABIM or the Al-Arqam movement
do insist on certain aspects of what most political scientists see as
democratic values, but reject others and loudly voice their demands
for provisions contradicting democratic ideals.
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The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) praises Malaysia’s
political stability, its high degree of  state development, the stability of
institutions and the economy, as well as the absence of  undemocratic
veto powers. However, Malaysia is classified as a ‘moderate autocracy’
(gemäßigte Autokratie). The BTI locates Malaysia’s problems mainly in
the political structure and the “dynamics driven by ethno-religious
tensions”.45 The “divisions” and “increasing tensions between the
Muslim majority and non-Muslim minority” pose threats to the
democracy, just as “corruption and fundamentalist Islam”46 do to state
institutions and the secular government. The report sees the persistence
of key shortcomings, “particularly regarding the electoral process, free
media, political representation, rule of  law, the effective and efficient
democratic institutions, and consensus-building”.47 The incident of the
conversion rumours, where thousands of  protestors gathered at a church
after the word was spread via SMS text message that hundreds of Muslim
were about to be baptised and converted, is mentioned as a disturbing
symptom of the increasing radicalism of certain Muslim groups,48 just
as the emergence and good organisation of the secular NGOs is praised
as a positive development.
The high-profile cases of Islamic burials of non-Muslims and
conversion of minors are illustrated, but surprisingly no direct reference
to limited equality before the law is made. Although here unmentioned,
the deficits in legal egalitarianism are a significant hindrance to liberal
democracy.49 Although scholars of  democracy studies disagree on the
importance of  social equality for democracy, legal equality is largely
without controversy. Especially the fact that Malaysia’s allegedly
shari>‘ah-inspired laws prove very discriminating towards women (see
the publications of Sisters in Islam and the works of Norani Othman)
suggests that equality before the law is not only threatened by individual
cases as those described earlier, but that inequality indeed cuts through
the whole system and is thus a structural problem.
–––––––––––––––––
45 Olivier Roy, “Le découplage”, p. 242.
46 The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2008, p. 2.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid. p. 5.
49 Ibid.
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A major reason for pessimism among defenders and advocates
of democracy and human rights is the increase of ‘Muslim’ symbols,
institutions and structures, mostly simplified to ‘Islamisation’. As the
example of Sisters in Islam shows, political argumentation based on
religion does not necessarily contradict democracy or human rights.
Problematic is rather the character of the brand of Islam that is being
promoted by influential parts of the government: an ethno-nationalist
exclusive version, catering mainly to a limited group, in this case
individuals classified as male, Muslim and Malay. Problematic is also
the brand that parts of  PAS, ABIM and Islamist groups like Jamaah
Islah Malaysia try to sell, namely a literalist patriarchal version that
denies any other ways of  life their existence on an equal footing.
The term ‘Islamisation’ usually refers to the growing presence
of  symbols and ideas that are used and promoted by these groups. As
explained, Clive Kessler sees the Malaysia since 2007 as one that is
ruled by an “explicitly Islamist, Islamizing, shari>‘ah-promoting and anti-
secular party”.50 Are these the last steps before the finalisation of an
‘Islamic state’? As so often, the question is incomplete without a
definition. Most Islamists would deny that Malaysia is anywhere near
an Islamic state, they claim there has not been an Islamic state since
the death of  Ali, the last of  the four Rightly Guided Caliphs. Their
demands however, as outlined above, vary, and so do the definitions.
A word that is often used to describe ‘Islamist’ regimes like Iran is
theocracy, although it should accurately be ‘rule of  the clergy’, rather
than rule of  God. A rule of  the clergy would be an oligarchy and thus
incompatible with the version of Islam that Muslim intellectuals like
Abdullahi An Na-im promote. The role of  Islam in Malaysia’s historic
and contemporary politics is controversial. While the problem that the
term ‘Islamisation’ describes remains serious, the wording might be
misleading. The analysis has shown that the real threat is a party that is
too powerful and that uses its power to create a constant atmosphere
of insecurity and division to legitimise itself.
–––––––––––––––––
50 The German term ‚Rechtsstaatlichkeit‘ or ‚rule of law‘ is often used as an
adjective for today’s liberal democracies: ‘rechtsstaaliche Demokratie’. This shows how
closely connected the concepts of democracy and rule of law are.
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One of  its instruments, and one of  increasing importance for
various illustrated reasons, is religion, specifically Islam.
The growing communitarianism is attested by foreign51 as well
as local scholars.52 One outcome and reason of  this tendency is the
language in which the various actors and individuals are referred to,
often by those in power, but sometimes also by those who actually
oppose the divisive results.
–––––––––––––––––
51 Clive S. Kessler, Islam, the State, p. 70.
52 For instance, The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2008.
53 See Farish A. Noor, “Race and Islam”.
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